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Systemic Surveillance and Use of MacroPrudential Indicators
Ik Muo*
I.

Introduction

T

he clamour for Macro-prudential (MP) paradigm did not start in 2008 although, it
must be acknowledged that the recent global financial and economic crises reignited the interest for an MP approach to regulatory intervention as well as
heightened its importance and urgency. As at 2003, Borio stressed the need to
strengthen the macro- prudential orientation of the regulatory and supervisory
framework (Borio, 2003). Other earlier writers like Crockett (2000a and 2000b), Borio, et
al. (2001) and Tsatsaronis (2002). Mortinnen, et al. (2005), emphasised the importance
of MP analyses, influenced by the lessons of the banking crises experienced in the
1980s and 1990s. They called for a proper appreciation of emergent potential sources
of risks rather than concentrating on the extant sources. The 2008 crises were
indications that the new sources of risks were not fully appreciated or if they were
appreciated, they were not proactively managed or contained.
Two major lessons that emerged and were reinforced by the 2008/2009 crises(the
ghosts of which are still hovering around the globe) are the speed and high impact of
contagion (accentuated by innovations in technology) and the dangers created by
institutions that are too big(and complicated) to fail and too big to save (systemically
important financial institutions). The too-big syndrome is not a new development
because Borio (2003) emphasised that larger institutions have greater system-wide
significance and as such, from an MP perspective, they would be subject to tighter
prudential standards. This is indeed consistent with the traditional practice of at least
subjecting them to more frequent and intense supervision. Lehman was both an
example of the dangers of contagion and the too-big syndrome. Prior to the collapse
of Lehman, the US and global financial markets were already in crises but these were
still of manageable proportion. But the fragile trust and credibility that still existed
vanished on September 15, 2008 when Lehman collapsed. The failure of Lehman (or
the decision not to save it) was catastrophic because it put at risk the US funds market
worth US$3.5 trillion and the entire global financial architecture. It not only impacted
on others who held securities 'manufactured' by the firm, but also had a panic effect.
By that weekend, (following the collapse of Lehman), more than US$200 billion had
been pulled out from money market funds by retail and institutional investors. When
Ik Muo is with the Department of Business Administration of the Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-Iwoye. The usual
disclaimer applies.

Central Bank of Nigeria

Economic and Financial Review

Volume 50/4

December 2012

86

Central Bank of Nigeria

Economic and Financial Review

Volume 50/4

December 2012

87

other funds are included, the hemorrhage was up to US$400 billion (Duyn, et al, 2008).
This was notwithstanding the fact that Lehman Brothers operated mostly from the US
and that the sub-prime crisis was mostly a US/UK affair.
On the 'too-big-to-fail' issue, the combined assets of the BIG 5 in the UK are worth 4
times the GDP. Wolf (2008) estimated that a recapitalisation of 1.0 per cent of their
assets would cost the British Government an increase in debt of 4.0 per cent of GDP,
while 5.0 per cent recapitalisation would lead to 20.0 per cent of GDP in debts. Efforts
to save the Citigroup were very difficult because of its size, complicated structure and
operations (Muo, 2010). The contagion effect also relates to government policies.
That is why up to this moment, the quantitative easing (QE3) programme of the US Fed
is being criticised because of its impact on other countries. While Bernanke believes
that it boosts US spending and growth and thus supporting the global economy
(positive contagion), others like Guide Mantega (Brazil's Minister of Finance) and
Masaaki Shirakawa (Governor, Bank of Japan) are concerned about the loose credit
and volatile capital inflows into emerging markets.
This paper examines the practice of systemic surveillance through macro-prudential
analyses and use of macro-prudential indicators. The rest of the paper is divided into 6
parts. Part 2 discusses macro-prudential (MP) surveillance; Part 3 covers the key
methodologies and approaches while the MP indicators are x-rayed in Part 4. Part 5
reviews Nigerian experience with macro-prudential indicators (MPIs). Part 6 examines
other issues in systemic surveillance and the paper is concluded in part 7.

II.

What is Macro-Prudential Surveillance?

MP surveillance refers to a holistic approach to surveillance that examine the entire
financial system rather than the individual institutions (micro surveillance).
Borio(2003) states that the objective of a macro-prudential approach is to limit the risk
of episodes of financial distress with significant losses in terms of the real output for the
economy as a whole. On the contrary, the micro-prudential approach emphasises
limiting the risk of episodes of financial distress at individual institutions, regardless of
their impact on the overall economy. Thus, the MP approach falls squarely within the
macroeconomic tradition. MP analysis assesses the banking and financial systems as
a whole and covers the threats to financial stability, stemming from common shocks
affecting all (or a large part of) institutions or contagion of individual problems to the
rest of the system. MP analysis complements the work of micro-prudential supervisors,
as the risk of correlated failures, or the economic or financial market implications of
problems of financial institutions are not directly covered under the micro-prudential
perspective, which is best rationalised in terms of consumer (depositor or investor)
protection. Table 1 compares macro and micro approaches.
MP policy frameworks address explicitly systemic risk, adopt a system-wide analytical
perspective, and target tools at systemic risk. It subsumes its micro-prudential
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counterpart, holds a better promise of economic performance and is more likely to
deliver a safe and sound financial system. Indeed, the Financial Services Authority
(FSA) (2009) holds that micro-prudential supervision is necessary but not sufficient to
achieve a sound overall systemic stability and that is why the MP framework is
imperative, a framework that goes beyond the micro issues to address the entire
financial system.
Table1: Macro Vs Micro Prudential Perspectives
Macroprudential

Microprudential

Proximate objective

Limit financial system-wide
distress

Limit distress of individual
institutions

Ultimate objective

Avoid output(GDP) costs

Consumer( investor/
depositor )protection

Model of risk

In part, endogenous

Exogenous

Correlations and common
exposures across institutions

Important

Irrelevant

Calibration of prudential
controls

In terms of system-wide
distress, top-down

In terms of individual
institutions, bottom-up

Source: Borio C. (2003). Towards a macroprudential framework for financial supervision and regulation?
Bank for International Settlement (BIS) Working Papers No 128, February

MP policy is characterised by reference to three defining elements:
(i) Its objective: to limit systemic risk – the risk of widespread disruptions to the provision
of financial services that have serious negative consequences for the economy at
large.
(ii) Its scope: the focus is on the financial system as a whole (including the interactions
between the financial and real sectors) as opposed to individual components
(that take the rest of the system as given).
(iii) Its instruments and associated governance: it uses primarily prudential tools
calibrated to target the sources of systemic risk. Any non-prudential tools that are
part of the framework need to clearly target systemic risk.
MP perspective is concerned with the cross dimensions of scope, calibration, time
and size. The scope of MP framework should be rather broad and should cover all
institutions involved in fund intermediation and allocation of risks including non-bank
financial institutions, financial markets, payment and settlement systems and market
infrastructure. The prudential standards should be calibrated with respect to the
marginal contribution of an institution to system-wide macro risk. It would make an
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explicit distinction between the “systematic risk” (common exposure) charge and
the “idiosyncratic risk” charge. Larger institutions, because of their greater systemwide significance, should be subject to tighter prudential standards. With regards to
time dimension, cushions should be built up in upswings so as to be relied upon during
burst cycle so as to strengthen the banks' ability to absorb deteriorating economic
conditions, when access to external financing becomes more costly and
constrained. Moreover, by leaning against the wind, it could reduce the amplitude
of the financial cycle, thereby limiting the risk of financial distress in the first place. In
other words, this strategy would add a welcome counterweight to the powerful procyclical forces in the system.
MP policy also interacts closely with other spheres of public policy because those
other policies impact on systemic risk. For example, the stance of monetary policy
can affect risk-taking incentives. Similarly, fiscal policy and public debt levels can be
an important source of vulnerability for the financial sector. MP policy interventions, in
turn, have macroeconomic effects. For example, raising capital requirements in a
credit boom may, to some extent, dampen aggregate demand and, hence,
influence the macroeconomic policy environment. Because of these inter-linkages,
effective MP frameworks require institutional arrangements and governance
structures, tailored to national circumstances, that can ensure an open and frank
dialogue among policymakers on policy choices that impact on systemic risk, resolve
conflicts among policy objectives and instruments, and mobilise the right tools to limit
systemic risk.
Even under the emerging financial architecture where the conventional roles of the
central banks are being divided (as in the FSA model), it is argued and agreed that
the central bank should monitor and regulate strategic risks because financial
stability is closely aligned with the objectives of monetary policy and invariably
requires a lender of last resort powers (Blinder, 2010). It is also noteworthy that the
scope of Central bank responsibility is actually a continuum from micro to macro
specifically as it moves from, consumer protection, supervision of non-systemically
important financial institutions (SIFIs), supervision of systemically important financial
institutions (SIFIs), financial stability to monetary policy (Goodhart, 2010).

III.

Key methodologies/Approaches of MP Surveillance

The joint progress report to the G20 (FSB, IMF and BIS, 2011) summarises the key
approaches and methodologies used across countries as:
·
Aggregate indicators of imbalances: These indicators use macroeconomic
data or balance sheet indicators (e.g., bank credit, liquidity and maturity
mismatch, currency risk, and sectoral or external imbalances) to signal the
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build-up of risks in the financial system and the economy at large.. Measures of
credit growth can be complemented by other indicators, for example
unusually rapid asset-price growth, to form indicators of systemic risk build-up
that reflect the characteristics of individual economies.
·
Indicators of market conditions: These indicators focus on developments in
financial markets that may lead to generalised distress. They are typically
observed at higher frequencies than the aggregate indicators mentioned
above and behave more like coincident indicators of financial stress.
Indicators of risk appetite (e.g., spreads, risk premia), and of market liquidity
conditions are used extensively in some jurisdictions.
·
Metrics of concentration of risk within the system: These metrics relate to the
cross-sectional dimension of systemic risk and focus on the channels of
contagion and amplification. Beyond basic measures of size and
concentration, they capture more specifically common exposures and
interconnectedness among financial institutions (including non-bank financial
institutions), sectors (e.g., public and private), markets (e.g., funding and
credit markets), and countries.
·
Macro stress testing: Tools that have been developed to test the resilience of
individual institutions are being adapted to stress test financial systems by
augmenting the methodology in order to: incorporate market dynamics
under extreme (tail-risk) scenarios and the amplification arising from network
effects; and better assess the interactions between financial system distress
and the real economy, including through multi-round adverse feedback
effects. The importance of conducting top-down and bottom-up stress tests
simultaneously to cross-check results is being widely recognised.
·
Integrated monitoring systems: While the metrics and approaches described
above are useful on their own, they can often be combined into
comprehensive monitoring systems and sometimes into composite indicators.
This can provide a more coherent picture of conditions across the financial
system, tailored to specific domestic circumstances. Various institutions have
developed or are in the process of developing such frameworks for the
analysis of systemic risk.
They warned however that, the usefulness of specific metrics and indicators depends
on a range of country and context-specific factors.... The analysis of signals provided
by the indicators need to take account of the broader economic context. For
example, the policy response to a credit boom would differ if strong growth could be
attributable to productivity gains in the corporate sector or to a relaxation of lending
standards. Quantitative indicators are often combined with qualitative information
and intelligence gathered through regular contacts with market participants. Such
information can provide timely insight into trends and identify areas that require a
more systematic investigation.
It is important to stress that in terms of broad framework, there are differences
between the European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
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The MP Framework by the European Central Bank has three building blocks (Morttinen
et al, 2005).
1. Assessing current financial position of banks-their ability to withstand
disturbances (profitability, liquidity and capital adequacy);
2. Analysing actual and potential sources of risk to which the banks are exposed
and the size of those exposures. These may be from macroeconomic
developments, sectoral developments or inter-linkages between institutions
(credit risks, financial market risks, operational and legal risks, liquidity,
infrastructure and contagion risks); and
3. The resilience of the banks vis-à-vis different sources of risk and vulnerabilities.
For the IMF, a MP analyses framework revolves around the following:
·
Assessing the risk of shock in the financial system.
·
Recourse to financial stability indicators.
·
Analysing micro-financial interactions.
·
Monitoring macroeconomic situation (IMF, 2006).
Beyond the broad framework, there are also differences in terminologies and even
the number and measurement of the indicators. Thus, while ECB refers to it as macroprudential indicators, the IMF refers to it as Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs), which
also subdivided it to two, namely, core and encouraged. Argesti, et. al (2008)
undertook a comprehensive comparison of the two approaches, noting that the
areas of differences have been greatly narrowed down and that countries should
adopt what is most suitable to their context.

IV.

Macro-Prudential Indicators (MPI)

MPIs or FSIs are aggregated micro prudential indicators and they are used to assess
different sources of risk to the financial sector: financial strength (capital ratio),
vulnerabilities (asset qualities/liquidity); for non-financial sectors: assess risks from
exposure to these sectors and for peer groups: identify exact sources of risks (Craig,
2002). Broadly, those most commonly used include:
(i) tools to address threats to financial stability arising from excessive credit expansion
and asset price booms, particularly in real estate markets, both residential and
commercial (e.g., dynamic capital buffers, dynamic provisions, loan-to-value (LTV)
and debt service-to-income (DTI) ratios), but also the terms and conditions of
transactions in wholesale financial markets (e.g., margins);
(ii) tools to address key amplification mechanisms of systemic risk linked to leverage
(e.g. capital tools) and maturity mismatches (e.g., market and funding liquidity
tools),including adjustments to take into account the prominent role played by
ballooning intra-financial system exposures in the run-up to the current crisis (e.g., risk
weights or limits on intra-financial system exposures); and
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(iii) tools to mitigate structural vulnerabilities in the system and limit systemic spillovers in
times of stress, such as additional loss absorbing capacity for SIFIs. Disclosure
requirements that target common exposures, risk factors and interconnectedness
(rather than the risk profiles of individual institutions on a standalone basis), and
specific requirements for SIFIs in the context of effective resolution framework are also
key supportive instruments in this area.
Infrastructure policies (robust payment and settlement systems, trading infrastructure,
etc.) are systemic by definition and have always been a core policy strand, well
before the crisis. Measures to enhance robustness of financial market infrastructure
could help address the cross sectional dimension of systemic risk, and are considered
complementary macro-prudential tools for the purposes of this paper, which focuses
on changes in prudential standards.
Selialia, et. al (2010) highlighted three main approaches for identifying MPIs /FSIs. The
first approach is to adopt the standards established by international organisations
such as the IMF, BIS and ECB. The second approach is based on the underlying
economic theories of financial instability as espoused by Davis (1999) that data
requirements for MP analysis are dictated by the theories underpinning the concept of
financial instability. Examples of the theories include the monetary approach and the
concept of uncertainty and asymmetrical information and agency costs. The third
approach is based on the linkages or interactions between the financial sector and
other sectors of the economy. It is summarised with the aid of the circular flow of
income and expenditure. The most important issue is that the indicators should be
analytically and empirically relevant, that is, there should be a sensible basis for
expecting a relationship between the indicator and financial instability, and indicators
should have predictive power or be classified as leading indicators in the sense that
changes in one variable precede changes in another.
Table 2: Macro-prudential indicators derived from economic theories
Theories
Theories of financial
fragility

Main Emphasis
Debt accumulation: rising
corporate and household
debts relative to assets

Recommended Indicators
Macroeconomic variables, real estate,
economic sector growth, income gearing,
corporate and household debts, sectoral
balance sheet, credit markets and
investment trends

Monetarist
Approach

Growth of monetary
aggregates; monetary policy
in general
Use of micro-data from
balance sheet and P&L
statements
Disaster myopia. Summarise
and emphasise other theories.
Deviation from long-term
averages are emphasised
Vulnerability to external
shocks, role of international
capital flows

Monetary aggregates, interest rates,
inflation, exchange rates

Risk of bank runs

Uncertainty, credit
rationing and
Asymmetrical
information
International aspects

Source: Selialia et al (2010), p.13

Capital adequacy, overall interest rate
margin, return on assets, share prices,
interbank claims and liabilities
Loan spreads, rapid growth of markets,
sectoral distribution of credit, bank credit
ratios, net worth of customers
Foreign reserves, balance of payment
transactions, foreign currency borrowing,
capital inflows and contagion, commodity
prices
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Following the IMF classification, there are core indicators (essential to all countries,
and covers the banking industry due to its critical role in financial stability and could
be compiled for many countries) and encouraged indicators (relevant to some
countries, depending on structure).
The core indicators are:
· Regulatory ratios (non-performing loans/total loans, distribution of
loans and large exposures/capital)
· Earnings and profitability (return on equity, return of assets, interest
margins and expenses ratio)
· Liquidity (liquid asset ratio, liquid assets/short-term liabilities)
· Market risks (foreign exchange net open position, duration (maturity
mismatch)
The Encouraged indicators are
· Other banking sector FSI (leverage ratio, trading income, gross
derivatives position)
· Liquidity in the security market (bid-ask spread, average daily
turnover)
· Non-banking financial institutions (leverage)
· Non-financial sectors (corporate leverage, ROE, Foreign exchange,
real estate)
The ECB on its own monitors scores of indicators categorised as:
Internal factors
· Profitability, balance sheet and capital adequacy
· Demand and supply (Competitive) position
· Risk composition
· Market assessment risk
External factors
· financial fragility
· asset price developments
· cyclical and monetary developments
Contagion factors
· Interbank market
The differences between the IMF's FSI and ECB's MPI are as follows. The FSI is a broad
framework that covers the whole economy while the MPI covers other parts of the
economy as counterparties to the financial sector and its compilation approach
dwells comprehensively on the risks facing the banking industry. Furthermore, the MPIs
were more aligned with accounting and supervisory standards and thus, little
adjustments were made by authorities that adopted these standards, unlike the case
of the FSIs. The origins of the two measures are also different; the FSIs are outcomes of
the EU integration and in particular, the mandate to ensure smooth conduct of
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policies for smooth prudential supervision and financial stability. The MPIs were the
outcome of the global crises of 1980s and 1990s, especially the Asian crises where
data and information gaps hindered detection and response to the crises, (Argresti
et al, 2008).
The amendments to the IMF guide have significantly narrowed the gap between the
two. It is also important to stress that both measures have the same goal: to provide
quantitative benchmarks for banking soundness, they overlap significantly in the
banking sector indicators and both measure capital adequacy, asset quality,
earnings and profitability, liquidity and sensitivity to risks

V.

MPIs in Nigeria

Nigeria is a part of the globe and is affected by global developments. There is no
doubt that CBN pays attention to financial stability and is engaged on MP
regulations. It has a Deputy Governor for Financial Stability and a Financial Policy and
Regulation Department with responsibility for MP regulation/supervision. This reflects a
structural design indicating strategic redirection. The CBN Pillar Two revolves around
ensuring financial stability under which the agenda are to establish financial stability
committee, deal with macro prudential issues, engage in capital market
development (as an alternative to bank funding) and the enthronement of
countercyclical fiscal policies (the other three pillars: enhancing the quality of banks,
enabling healthy financial sector evolution and ensuring that the financial sector
contributes to the development of the real economy). The Financial Stability
Committee is already functional, stress testing is a biannual affair, and like in other
climes, efforts are being made to identify D-SIBs (domestically systemic important
banks; the ones termed too big to fail!) for “bumper to bumper” monitoring. The Bank
also has its bi-annual Financial Stability Report which gauges and publishes the health
of the financial system. It has adopted and calculates a set of Financial Soundness
Indicators. These FSIs for December 2010 and 2011 are shown in the Table below:
Table 3: FSIs for December 2010 and December 2011
SN Indicators
1
Asset Based Indicators
?
NPL/TL
?
CLA/TA
?
LA/STL
2
Capital Based Indicators
?
RC/RWA
?
T1C/RWA
3

Income and Expenses Based
Indicators
?
IM/GI
?
PC/NIE
?
NIE/GI

December 2010

December 2011

?
17.2%
?
18.7%
?
19.8%

?
4.9%
?
25.7%
?
31.2%

?
7%
?
4.1%

?17.8%
?18.1%

?
27.1%

?
45.2%
?
36%
?
75.4%

NPL-Non performing loan; TL-Total loan; CLA-Core Liquid Assets; TA-Total Assets; LA-Liquid Assets; STL- Short-term
liabilities; RC-Regulatory Capital; RWA-Risk Weighted Assets; T1C-Tier One Capital; IM-Interest Margin; GI Gross Income;
PC Personnel Cost; NIE-Non-Interest Expense
Extracted from CBN Financial Stability Report, December 2010 and 2011.
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These MPIs or FSIs are useful and usable in ensuring MP surveillance but given our
recent history and experiences, there is need to adopt and/or develop other
indicators. This is because while the issue of MP surveillance and application of MPIs
are global, local peculiarities should influence the scope and usage of these
instruments. Indeed, FSA (2009) warned that the usefulness of specific metrics and
indicators depends on a range of country and context-specific factors.... The analysis
of signals provided by the indicators need to take account of the broader economic
context. Furthermore, Kamgna et al (2009) undertook a study of the Central African
States (CEMAC Zone) and concluded that Central banks in that region should focus
on the following 6 indicators. Claims on the private sector, FDI and a combination of
exports and credits to the private sector increase the risk of degradation in the
banking sector; and increase in exchange rate, increase in the internal resources of
the banks and the rate of inflation which reduce the risk of degradation in the banking
system. Selialia, et al (2010) also did a study of the South African situation with context
specific consideration.
Consequently, these indicators are to be considered as relevant for the Nigerian
situation:
·
Sectoral exposure to stocks, oil and gas, real estate, aviation and government
contracts;
·
Distribution and concentration of credits;
·
Rate of credit expansion relative to the growth of the economy;
·
The extent to which banks are dependent on the interbank market;
·
Foreign exchange trends: exchange rates and flows;
·
Quantum and terms of access of foreign funds; and
·
Exposure to non-banking financial institutions (NBFIs) which may indicate
unwholesome fund flows.
Whether using the existing MPIs (as already discussed), designing a new set of 'local
content' indicators, or adopting more from the basket of IMF/ECB FSIs/MPIs, it is
important to remember that each indicator monitors different risks. Capital
adequacy MPIs monitor financial strength; ability to absorb shocks. Asset quality MPIs
– vulnerability to credit risk exposure; Market risk MPIs – vulnerability to currency and
maturity mismatch and Liquidity MPIs- vulnerability to loss of access to funding. It
should further be noted that these indicators should be analysed and utilised in
combination; that stress testing is a critical element of MP analyses and supervision
and that data should be sourced from various sources for proper analysis. Craig
(2002), also emphasizes the need to enhance the role of these indicators by, among
other things, strengthening their analyses by determining economic linkages
between the MPIs, integrate them with stress testing, and identify relevant information
from all possible sources, adopt the compilation guide and encourage its
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dissemination.
The MPIs are meant to indicate threats to the financial system following which
appropriate measures are taken depending on the nature, direction and seriousness
of the threats. The commonly used instruments and when they are used are shown
below.
Table 4: Commonly used MP instruments
SN

Focus of Instruments

Examples of Instruments

1

Tools that address threats from excessive
credit expansion in the system

Time-varying capital requirements (e.g., risk
weights)
?
Dynamic provisions
?
Ceilings on credit or credit growth
?
Caps, possibly time-varying, on loan-tovalue (LTV) ratio
?
Caps, possibly time-varying, on debt
service-to-income (DTI) ratio
?
Minimum, possibly time varying, margin
requirements
?
Reserve requirements

2

Tools that address key amplification
mechanisms of systemic risks

Limits on maturity mismatches
?
Caps on foreign currency lending
?
Limits on net open currency positions or
mismatches
?
Levy on non-core funding

3

Tools that mitigate structural vulnerabilities
and limit spill over from stress

Additional loss absorbency related to
systemic importance
?
Disclosure policy for markets and
institutions targeting systemic risk
?
Resolution requirements for SIFIs

Source: FSB, IMF and BIS, (2011).
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It is important to take note of the following:
·
The instruments are often used in combination (e.g., some countries have varied
LTV and DTI ratios jointly to tame real estate booms). The use of multiple
instruments has advantages (it provides greater assurances of effectiveness by
addressing different sources of risk) but may be difficult to coordinate and also
harder to communicate than single tools;
·
Instruments to address excessive credit expansion in the system tend to target
specific types of exposure. Differentiation by currency has been used in
jurisdictions where growth in foreign currency-denominated lending was of
concern. The flexibility of a more tailored and targeted approach is self-evident,
but there are also limitations. For example, it requires more granular data, has
higher administrative costs, may be more susceptible to circumvention and, if
taken too far, could inadvertently result in intrusive credit allocation;
·
To contain the risk of unsustainable real estate booms, a number of jurisdictions
have taken actions to restrict mortgage credit. Instruments include LTV, DTI and
changing the terms on mortgage insurance; and
·
Calibrations are often based on discretion and judgment rather than rules,
although some countries have used rule-based instruments. While rules have
merits – they can help to overcome policy inertia, enhance accountability, and
create greater certainty for the industry and designing them may be difficult,
especially when multiple instruments are being used in combination. This is why
rules are often complemented with discretion.
Some of these policies might have unintended consequences. The British Bankers
Association (2012), identified some of the unintended consequences of some MP
measures as follows:
Table 5: Unintended Consequences of Some MP Instruments
S/N
1

MP Instrument
Counter-cyclical buffer

Unintended Consequences
Increased exposure to riskier sectors to maintain ROE

2

Sectoral capital
requirements

3

Maximum leverage
ratio

Increase incentive to hold risky assets or complex off
balance-sheet arrangements

4

Counter-cyclical
liquidity buffer

May encourage riskier activities and inefficient use of
liquidity which is a loss to the economy

5

LTV/LTI restrictions

May exclude some borrowers from the market. Drive
activities to the shadow market

Shift risk to other sectors

Source: British Bankers Association (2012).
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It is also important to note that some MP instruments are more effective under certain
circumstances than the other as indicated in this work by Lim et. al (2011).
Table 6: Effectiveness of Macro-prudential instruments
Reductions in:

Pro-cyclicality of
Credit

Pro-cyclicality
of Leverage

Caps on LTV

Statistically
Significant
Significant
Significant

Not statistically
significant
Significant
Significant

Significant

Significant

Significant

Significant

Significant

Significant

Significant

Significant

Not statistically
significant

Significant

Caps on DTV
Limits on Credit
Growth
Limits on NOP
Limits on maturity
mismatch
Reserve
requirements
Time
varying/dynamic
provisioning
Countercyclical/
time varying
capital
requirements

Interconnectedness
Of Foreign
funding

Interconnectednes
s of wholesale
funding

Statistically
significant
Not statistically
significant

Not significant
Statistically
significant

LTV-Loan to value; DTI-Debt to Income; NOP: Net Open Position
Source: Lim et al (2011) Macro-Prudential Policy: What Instruments and How to Use Them: Lessons from
Country Experience. IMF Working Paper 11/238
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These instruments should also be regularly updated. The EU has already proposed a
regulation to mitigate pro-cyclical effects of prudential regulations and most
importantly, to ensure that banks accumulate capital during boom years to be
applied as shock absorbers during recession. This involves the introduction of a fixed
conservation buffer (graduated between 2016 and 2018), variable countercyclical
buffer and an option to introduce a systemic buffer.
Table 7: Proposed Capital Buffer under the Capital Requirement Directive (CRD) IV
Capital Buffer
under the current
CRD draft
Use

Conservation
buffer

Counter-cyclical
capital buffer

Systemic buffer

Permanent

Judgment

Objective

Ensure sufficient
capital to absorb
losses during stress
period

Judgment based
on European
Systemic Risk
Board (ESRB)
guidelines
Mitigate risks due
to excessive
credit growth

Level

2.5%(built
gradually
between 20162018

Applicability
Authority

All banks
Competent
authority or
designated
authority

Up to 2.5% (but
higher level can
be imposed by
national
authorities)
All banks
Designated
authority

Prevent and mitigate
long-term noncyclical
systemic or macroprudential risks not
covered by regulation
Up to 5% as follows:
0-3% national discretion
3-5% with opinion from
EC
All banks or a subset
Competent authority or
designated authority

Source: IMF (2012).

VI.
VI.1

Other Issues in Systemic Surveillance
Managing the Too Big Institutions

Effort must be made to identify and pay special attention to too-big institutions and
domestic systemically important banks. The ultimate goal is to reduce risk of systemic
financial crises and the resulting damage. Big banks should be subjected to special
prudential requirements so as to build confidence in the system and avoid instability,
protect depositors and avoid the contagion of the impact of the collapse of one firm
on the other, (FSA, 2009). Some of the options include:
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·
subjecting the largest, systemically important financial institutions to higher capital
and liquidity requirements, larger capital buffers/reserves and possibly tighter
restrictions on leverage. The aim here would be to reduce the probability of such a
firm getting to the point of failure and requiring public support. At the margin,
higher capital and liquidity buffers would also reduce the impact of failure; and
·
restricting the range of activities that the largest financial institutions can engage
in, or the extent to which they can engage in higher risk activities. This would be on
the basis that in the last crisis the main source of many institutional difficulties was
over-expansion into activities that are well beyond their core' business and the
range of experience of their boards and senior managements. A further step on
this path could include consideration of the creation of 'narrow banks' whose
function would be to provide liquidity and payment services and whose activities
would be limited to investing in 'safe' assets. This would be intended to create a
clear barrier between utility banking and riskier, highly leveraged trading
activities. Such approaches would again be intended to reduce the probability
of failure of the banks at the core of any country's financial system. The new model
might have addressed some of these concerns restricting the size of financial
institutions, either in absolute terms or in relation to the size of the particular market
or markets in which they are active. This might be achieved through regulatory or
competition policy or some combination of the two. Such an approach would
seek to avoid any institution becoming 'too big' in the first place, thereby allowing
its failure to be absorbed in an orderly way.
FSA (2009) also itemises the drawback and challenges of some of these policy
options. They are:
First, there is a difficult boundary issue – where does the regulator draw the line
between those financial institutions that are to be subject to these requirements and
those that are not? As noted above this may be obvious in some highly concentrated
banking systems, but it is not in other, more diversified banking systems. Moreover, it is
difficult to envisage how such a 'list' could be drawn up. While it might be felt
appropriate, in certain circumstances, to allow a relatively large firm to fail, in other
circumstances the correct response might well be to support a small firm. This
illustrates the point that authorities need to have regard to the systemic nature of the
situation as well as of the individual firm. The former cannot be predicted. That said, it
might be misleading to think of the divide between 'systemic' and 'non-systemic' as
being hard. It may be possible to develop a sliding scale approach, where supervisory
requirements of a firm increase with the consequences of the spillovers from its failure.
Second, it is unclear whether the 'price' extracted ex-ante (e.g. through higher
capital or liquidity requirements) will be sufficient to offset the impacts on incentives
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(particularly on the part of management) that will come from knowledge that the
institution falls into the category of too-big-too-fail. That said, boards and senior
management of the largest firms – as well as their counterparties, rating agencies etc.
– might well have already concluded that they fall into this category. Hence, any
incentives effects might be marginal.
Third, setting higher requirements determined solely by a financial institution's size risks
blunting the incentive for management to strengthen controls and risk management.
Fourth, restrictions on the size of a financial institution or the range of activities it
undertakes, while attractive in some respects, are difficult in practice to implement.
As the current crisis demonstrates, today's markets are global, as are many of the
customers of major financial institutions. Those customers need large, global banks
capable of offering a broad range of services. Restrictions on banks' activities would
reduce economies of scale and scope and limit diversification benefits for both banks
and to some extent their customers. In addition, it is far from clear that specialisation in
a relatively narrow field (e.g. mortgage lending) helped to avoid problems during the
current crisis. Banks' high-risk activities are not confined to their trading books.
Finally, although theoretically attractive, it is difficult to see how any split between
utility banking and investment banking could be implemented so as to avoid the risk
of contagion between the two types of bank. However, the combination of higher
capital requirements for trading risks, coupled with increased supervisory scrutiny of
these risks, might well mean that some banks decide to reduce their activities in this
area. But we can learn from the framework for global systemically important finance
institutions as approved by FSB in 2011 as follows:
· Requirements for resolvability assessments and for recovery and resolution
planning for global systemically important financial institutions, and for the
development of institutions-specific cross-border cooperation agreements so
that home and host authorities of G-SIFIs are better prepared for dealing with
crises and have clarity on how to cooperate in a crisis;
· Requirements for banks determined to be globally systemically important to
have additional loss absorption capacity tailored to the impact of their
default, rising from 1.0 per cent to 2.5 per cent of risk-weighted assets (with an
empty bucket of 3.5 per cent to discourage further systemicness), to be met
with common equity;
· More intensive and effective supervision of all SIFIs, including through stronger
supervisory mandates, resources and powers, and higher supervisory
expectations for risk management functions, data aggregation capabilities,
risk governance and internal controls (IMF, 2012).
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Therefore, the CBN should: establish a methodology for identifying domestic
systemically important banks and approve a specific list of entities; establish an
approach for domestic systemically important institutions: a methodology for
assessing the systemic importance of domestic institutions which should take into
consideration the impact of a D-SIB's failure on the domestic economy (for example
having regard to bank-specific factors such as size, interconnectedness,
substitutability/financial institution infrastructure, complexity –including the additional
complexities from cross-border activity); establish a list of these institutions and
conditions for retaining the membership of that list (permanent or flexible
membership?); and design a set of policy tools to be applied to contain the systemic
risks posed by D-SIBs.

VI.2

Moving Beyond the Mainstream Banking System

Financial stability concerns go beyond banks to non-bank financial institutions,
financial markets, payment and settlement systems and market infrastructure. Until
recently, there were little demarcations between these institutions and the banks. The
new banking model tries to create the demarcation either absolutely or through the
HOLDCO and ring-fencing mechanisms. There are also shadow and fringe operators
even though it might be argued that their impact might not be enough to destabilise
the system. While capturing the systemic implications of NBFIs requires institutional
collaboration, the issue of fringe institutions ('the system of credit intermediation that
involves entities and activities outside the regulated banking system') poses a
different challenge. This is more so in Nigeria where their activities have created
confidence crises for the banking system. The FSB recommended a three-point
framework for capturing and managing the systemic implications of these shadow
institutions.
The first step comprises a broad review of non-bank credit intermediation that aims to
identify the main trends and areas where additional scrutiny is warranted. In the
second step, the authorities narrow down the focus to areas where systemic risks are
most likely to be building, by drawing on a set of 'risk factors' that highlight incipient
problems. The set may include indicators of rising maturity and liquidity
transformation, measures of increasing leverage, and signals of imperfect credit risk
transfer practices. The authorities must also be alert to signs of regulatory arbitrage,
which adds to systemic risk by undermining the effectiveness of financial regulation.
The third step involves a detailed assessment of the potential systemic risks identified,
through an analysis of the possible impact on the system as a whole of severe distress
or failure of the most vulnerable shadow banking entities and/or activities.
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The Issue of Stress-Testing

Stress testing (ST) is the process of:
·
Defining potential adverse future economic scenarios;
·
Measuring the sensitivity of the banks market, investment and operational risk
portfolios to changes in economic variables resulting under extreme scenarios
defined above;
·
Aggregating the results and quantifying the overall negative impact on
planned profitability, capital levels and liquidity positions; and
·
Comparing the results to the board approved risk appetite levels and
implementing risk reduction business strategies, policy changes if the result of
the stress test exceeds the risk appetite.
Stress-testing may be top-down or bottom-up. Bottom up ST refers to the process
where the stress loss impact is measured on each and every loan contract, trading or
investment position, operational process, taking into account, the specific terms and
conditions of that contract. It is top-down when it is done at the portfolio and not
individual account level and an implicit assumption is made that the risk
characteristics of each account in the portfolio is the same. ST is an inescapable
aspect of MP surveillance and the CBN should not relent in its regular utilisation of this
instrument

VI.4.

The Issue of Governance

MP policy interacts closely with other spheres of public policy because those other
policies impact on systemic risk. For example, the stance of monetary policy can
affect risk-taking incentives. Similarly, fiscal policy and public debt levels can be an
important source of vulnerability for the financial sector. MP policy interventions, in
turn, have macroeconomic effects. For example, raising capital requirements in a
credit boom might to some extent dampen aggregate demand and, hence,
influence the macroeconomic policy environment. Because of these inter-linkages,
effective MP frameworks require institutional arrangements and governance
structures, tailored to national circumstances, that can ensure an open and frank
dialogue among policymakers on policy choices that impact on systemic risk, resolve
conflicts among policy objectives and instruments, and mobilise the right tools to limit
systemic risk. There exist monetary stability committee and the financial services
coordinating council. But other countries have moved beyond the financial services
authority to the establishment of the systemic risk board with membership drawn from
a cross section of stakeholders in banking, finance, government, academia and
statisticians. As the IMF report indicates, it involves a lot of institutional, legislative and
institutional re-engineering.
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Concluding Remarks

The ghost of 2008 crises is still very much around and evidences include the Europe
wide protest of November 14, 2012 and the continuous worry about the future of the
Euro and Eurozone; endless Greece bailout discussions, tensions and drama,
miserable global growth rate in the past four years and the key issues that dominated
the just concluded US Presidential elections. The key lesson of 2008 is that history
repeats itself because men-and women-always ignore the lessons of history. If the
wrenching experiences of 2008 are to be avoided, we must ensure systemic
surveillance through macro-prudential analyses, application of MPIs and instruments
and continually update the indicators and instruments, processes and governance
issues must be ensured.
The CBN has already gone a long way in this direction, with a functional financial
stability board, regular measurement and publication of MPIs and also regular stress
testing. The scope of the MPIs should be improved to include some indicators that are
particularly relevant to Nigeria's situation. The instruments should be adopted with
caution, noting those that have worked and are likely to work given our peculiarities.
Identifying and managing the too-big institutions requires serious attention and
institutional building for systemic risk management continues to be a challenge.
Going forward, the challenges faced in the adoption and implementation MP
analyses are numerous. Abolo (2012) identifies some of them as how the consuming
institutions can manage micro- and macro-regulations, the independence and
power to conduct effective MP analysis, coordination between institutions and
authorities, the most effective instruments and frameworks and whether to be rule –
based or discretionary in outlook as well as how to ensure harmony between
monetary, fiscal and prudential policies. There are situations in which several
international authorities take positions that are at times not exactly the same.
Whatever the case, the CBN should continue to forge ahead on the MP roadmap,
ensuring that it develops a globally attuned but locally relevant institutional and
analytical framework as well as the international and local institutional collaboration
necessary for the attainment of MP analyses and systemic surveillance.
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